

U.S. Announces New Iran-related Sanctions

Press Statement
Heather Nauert
Department Spokesperson
Washington, DC
July 18, 2017

The United States remains deeply concerned about Iran's malign activities across the Middle East which undermine regional stability, security, and prosperity. Iran continues to support terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad that threaten Israel and stability in the Middle East. Iran has maintained its steadfast support for the Assad regime, despite Assad's atrocities against his own people. Iran also continues to provide the Houthi rebels in Yemen with advanced weaponry that threatens freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, has been used to attack Saudi Arabia, and is prolonging the Yemen conflict. Additionally, Iran continues to test and develop ballistic missiles, in direct defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) states the anticipation of JCPOA participants that "full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security." However, Iran's other malign activities are serving to undercut whatever "positive contributions" to regional and international peace and security were intended to emerge from the JCPOA.

In response to these continued Iranian threats, the Administration today announces that it has designated 18 entities and individuals supporting Iran's ballistic missile program and for supporting Iran's military procurement or Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as an Iran-based transnational criminal organization and associated persons. Today's actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and supporters of such activity, as well as E.O. 13581, which targets transnational criminal organizations.

Specifically, the U.S. Department of State designated two entities pursuant to E.O. 13382 for engaging, or attempting to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The State Department designated the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (ASF SSJO), which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches. In addition, the State Department designated the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (RSSJO), which is responsible for the research and development of ballistic missiles.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), designated seven entities and five individuals for engaging in activities in support of Iran's military procurement or the IRGC, as well as an Iran-based transnational criminal organization and three associated persons. Today's action targets three networks supporting Iran's military procurement or the IRGC through the development of unmanned aerial vehicles and military equipment for the IRGC, the production and maintenance of fast attack boats for the IRGC-Navy, or the procurement of electronic components for entities that support Iran's military. OFAC also designated two Iranian businessmen and associated

entities who orchestrated the theft of U.S. and western software programs which, at times, were sold to the Government of Iran.

The Iranian regime also continues to detain U.S. citizens and other foreigners on fabricated national-security related charges. We call upon Iran to release U.S. citizens Baquer Namazi, Siamak Namazi, and Xiyue Wang, and all other unjustly detained U.S. citizens, so that they can be reunited with their families. The United States is deeply concerned about reports of the declining health of the Namazis, Wang, and other detained U.S. citizens. Iran should immediately release all of these U.S. citizens on humanitarian grounds. It has also been more than a decade since Robert Levinson disappeared from Iran's Kish Island. Iran committed to cooperating with the United States in bringing Bob home and we call on Iran to fulfill this commitment. The United States remains unwavering in its efforts to return Bob to his family. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has offered a \$5 million reward for any information that could lead to Bob's safe return. We call on anyone with information about this case to contact the FBI at <http://tips.fbi.gov> or email the FBI at levinsonfbireward@ic.fbi.gov. Information will be kept confidential and can be provided anonymously.

Iran's regime has an egregious human rights record, which includes denial of the freedom of religion or belief as well as other human rights and fundamental freedoms to individuals in Iran. Notably, arbitrary arrest and detention of members of religious minorities and political activists, is common as is the use of torture and other forms of abuse in detention. On June 27, the United States released its annual report on Trafficking in Persons. In the report, Iran is again ranked as a Tier 3 country because it does not take significant steps to address its extensive trafficking problem nor does it fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. Iran is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. Notably, Iran also coerces Afghan refugees into participating in combat in Syria, deporting those who refuse to do so, and it supports militias fighting in Iraq that recruited and used child soldiers. These abhorrent abuses only fuel conflict throughout the Middle East.

The Administration is continuing to conduct a full review of U.S. policy toward Iran. During the course of this review, the United States will continue to aggressively counter Iran's malign activities in the region. While the review is ongoing, the United States will also continue to expect strict Iranian adherence to Iran's nuclear commitments under the JCPOA and look to the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue to monitor and verify all of Iran's nuclear commitments. In addition, the United States will continue to comply with its commitments under the JCPOA. As a result, we communicated to the U.S. Congress on July 17 that the United States continues to waive sanctions as required to continue implementing U.S. sanctions-lifting commitments in the JCPOA, and is certifying to Congress that, based on available information, the conditions of Section 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, including as amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17), enacted on May 22, 2015, are met as of July 17, 2017. We also note Iran's continued malign activities outside the nuclear issue undermine the positive contributions to regional and international peace and security that the deal was supposed to provide. The United States will continue to use sanctions to target those who lend support to Iran's destabilizing behavior and above all, the United States will never allow the regime in Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Non-proliferation Designations, Transnational Criminal Organizations Designations
7/18/2017
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

AJILY, Mohammed Saeed (a.k.a. AJILI, Sa'id); DOB 03 Sep 1982; nationality Iran (individual) [TCO] (Linked To: AJILY SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT GROUP).

GHASEMI, Seyyed Reza (a.k.a. QASEMI, Seyed Reza); Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; National ID No. 004-3-94558-9 (Iran); Chief Executive Officer, Rayan Roshd Afzar Company; Managing Director, Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: RAYAN ROSHD AFZAR COMPANY).

HAKEMZADEH, Farshad; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; National ID No. 005-1-61706-4 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: RAYAN ROSHD AFZAR COMPANY).

LIU, Emily (a.k.a. BAOXIA, Liu; a.k.a. LAU, Emily), China; DOB 10 Sep 1981; POB Shandong, China; nationality China; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Female; Passport G28882492 (China) expires 04 May 2018 (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES).

PARSAJAM, Mohsen (a.k.a. HODJAT ABADI, Mohsen Kargar; a.k.a. HODJATABADI, Mohsen Kargar; a.k.a. "KARGAR, Mohsen"); DOB 23 Aug 1964; POB Qom, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport N95873956 (Iran) expires 05 May 2020; National ID No. 038-1-57690-6 (Iran); Chairman of the Board, Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: RAYAN ROSHD AFZAR COMPANY).

REZAKHAH, Mohammed Reza (a.k.a. REZAKHAH, Mohammad Reza); DOB 04 Aug 1978; nationality Iran (individual) [TCO] (Linked To: AJILY SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT GROUP).

TAVAN, Resit (a.k.a. TAVAN, Reshit); DOB 01 Jan 1977; nationality Turkey; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport U06314813 (Turkey) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: QESHM MADKANDALOO SHIPBUILDING COOPERATIVE CO).

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

ABASCIENCE TECH CO. LTD., Room 1724, Si Fang Building No. 5, Xiao Ying Road, ChaoYang District, Beijing 100101, China; 14C, Hung Shui Kiu Main Street, Yuen Long, N.T., Hong Kong; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; Linked To: LIU, Emily).

AJILY SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT GROUP, Iran [TCO].

ANDISHEH VESAL MIDDLE EAST COMPANY, No. 3, Unit 6, Daroos Building, Qanat Crossroad, Dolat St, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran [TCO] (Linked To: AJILY SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT GROUP).

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AEROSPACE FORCE SELF SUFFICIENCY JIHAD ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AEROSPACE FORCE RESEARCH AND SELF SUFFICIENCY JEHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AEROSPACE FORCE SELF-SUFFICIENCY JEHAD ORGANIZATION), Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR].

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS RESEARCH AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY JEHAD ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS RESEARCH AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY JIHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS SELF-SUFFICIENCY JEHAD ORGANIZATION), Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IFSR].

QESHM MADKANDALOO SHIPBUILDING COOPERATIVE CO (a.k.a. MAD KANDALU COMPANY; a.k.a. MAD KANDALU SHIPBUILDING COOPERATIVE; a.k.a. MAD KANDALU SHIPBUILDING COOPERATIVE QESHM; a.k.a. MADKANDALOU COMPANY), Qeshm Island, Iran; Website www.madkandaloo.com; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS).

RAMOR GROUP (a.k.a. RAMOR DIS TICARET VE İNŞAAT YATIRIM ANONİM ŞİRKETİ), Ataturk mah. 42 Ada Gardenya 7/1 Kat. 12 D.77 Atasehir, Istanbul, Turkey; 42A ADA Kat: 12, Daire: 77, No: 7/1, Gardenya Plaza, Atasehir, Istanbul 34758, Turkey; Website www.ramor.com.tr; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: TAVAN, Resit).

RAYAN ROSHD AFZAR COMPANY (a.k.a. RAYAN ROSHD COMPANY; a.k.a. "RAYAN ROSHD"), No. 16, Barzandeh St., North Sohrevardi St., Seyed Khandan, Tehran, Iran; Number 24 Barzandeh St., North Sohrevardi Ave., Tehran, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS).

RAYBEAM OPTRONICS CO. LTD., 10-D, Blessgo Industrial Park, Yanjiao High and New Tech Zone, Beijing 101601, China; 10-D Blessgo Industrial Park, Yanjiao Economic Development Zone, Sanhe, Hebei Province, China; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: LIU, Emily).

RAYTRONIC CORPORATION, LIMITED, No. 901, Jing Shu Dong Li, Haidian Dist, Beijing 100083, China; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: LIU, Emily).

SUNWAY TECH CO., LTD, No. 1724, Xiao Ying Rd, Si Fang Building, Chao Yang District, Beijing, China; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; Linked To: LIU, Emily).

Treasury Targets Persons Supporting Iranian Military and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

7/18/2017

Actions Coincide with State Department Designations Involving Iran's Ballistic Missile Program

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 16 entities and individuals for engaging in support of illicit Iranian actors or transnational criminal activity. These designations include seven entities and five individuals for engaging in activities in support of Iran's military or Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as an Iran-based transnational criminal organization and three associated persons. The three networks designated today supported Iran's military procurement or the IRGC through the development of unmanned aerial vehicles and military equipment for the IRGC, the production and maintenance of fast attack boats for the IRGC-Navy, or the procurement of electronic components for entities that support Iran's military. The transnational criminal organization designated today, along with two Iranian businessmen and an associated entity, orchestrated the theft of U.S. and western software programs which, at times, were sold to the Government of Iran. Today's actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and supporters of such activity, as well as E.O. 13581, which targets transnational criminal organizations.

The State Department also designated today two Iranian organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program pursuant to E.O. 13382.

"This Administration will continue to aggressively target Iran's malign activity, including their ongoing state support of terrorism, ballistic missile program, and human rights abuses," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. "These sanctions target procurement of advanced military hardware, such as fast attack boats and unmanned aerial vehicles, and send a strong signal that the United States cannot and will not tolerate Iran's provocative and destabilizing behavior. We will continue to target the IRGC and pressure Iran to cease its ballistic missile program and malign activities in the region."

As a result of this action, all property and interests in property of those designated today subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. In addition, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions for, or persons that provide material or certain other support, to the entities and individuals designated today risk exposure to sanctions that could sever their access to the U.S. financial system or block their property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction.

Rayan Roshd & Associated Individuals

OFAC designated Iran-based Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (Rayan Roshd) and three associated individuals pursuant to E.O. 13382 for proliferation activities related to a key element of Iran's military. Rayan Roshd has provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on October 25, 2007 for being a key Iranian entity of proliferation concern.

Rayan Roshd has produced technical components for the IRGC's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program and has sought to repair IRGC military equipment. Rayan Roshd has worked to produce software for the IRGC's aerospace program. Additionally, Rayan Roshd has produced tools that supported IRGC efforts to restrict and block social media and telecommunications content in Iran.

OFAC also designated three Iranian nationals for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Rayan Roshd. Mohsen Parsajam is Rayan Roshd's Chairman of the Board; Seyyed Reza Ghasemi serves as Chief Executive Officer; and Farshad Hakemzadeh is a Rayan Roshd representative.

Mohsen Parsajam obtained a range of military-applicable items from China on behalf of Rayan Roshd. Parsajam was involved in defense contracts, valued at tens of millions of dollars, between Rayan Roshd and its Iranian customers, including the IRGC-operated Qods Aviation Industries. Qods Aviation Industries was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on December 12, 2013, and is involved in the production of UAVs.

Seyyed Reza Ghasemi has also been involved in Rayan Roshd's defense contracts. Ghasemi has worked to expand Rayan Roshd's business activities with Iranian defense and security organizations. Hakemzadeh obtained a range of military-applicable items from China on behalf of Rayan Roshd.

Qeshm Madkandaloo and Turkey-based Procurement Network

Qeshm Madkandaloo Shipbuilding Cooperative Co (Qeshm Madkandaloo) was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. Qeshm Madkandaloo, on Qeshm Island, Iran has been a supplier to the IRGC-Navy of dockside equipment, as well as general support and maintenance services, since as early as 2011. The company has served multiple IRGC-Navy bases and has received weapons from the IRGC-Navy to test in the Strait of Hormuz. In its support to the IRGC-Navy, Qeshm Madkandaloo has assisted in the development of fast attack boat platforms, built dock infrastructure worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, and provided repair and maintenance services for dockside equipment such as cranes. Qeshm Madkandaloo has also been involved in the repair of IRGC-Navy equipment.

Ramor Group, also designated today pursuant to E.O. 13382, has provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Qeshm Madkandaloo. Ramor Group is a Turkey-based distribution company of marine equipment. As early as 2012, Ramor Group acted as the consignee for U.S.-origin goods ultimately destined for Qeshm Madkandaloo and sold goods directly to Qeshm Madkandaloo. Additionally, Ramor Group was involved in a project to develop a prototype vessel for Qeshm Madkandaloo. Ramor Group is also being designated today for being owned or controlled by Resit Tavan.

OFAC also designated Resit Tavan pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Qeshm Madkandaloo. Resit Tavan is the President and sole owner of Ramor Group. In his capacity as President, Resit Tavan acted as the broker for Qeshm

Madkandaloo, including to procure U.S.-origin goods, and has contributed to the gun and missile boat development at Qeshm Madkandaloo for the IRGC. In early June 2017, Resit Tavan was arrested for allegedly violating U.S. export control laws. (1)

Emily Liu & Associated Companies

Today, OFAC designated China-based procurement agent Emily Liu and four associated entities pursuant to E.O. 13382 for proliferation activities related to a key supporter of Iran's military. Emily Liu has provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Iran's Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI).

SEI was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on September 17, 2008 for being owned or controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). SEI is responsible for producing various electronics equipment for the Iranian military, including radars, microwave electron vacuum tubes, naval electronics, avionics, and control systems, training simulators, missile guidance technology, and electronic test equipment.

Since at least 2014, China-based procurement agent Emily Liu has sought to procure U.S.-, Canadian-, and European-origin electronic components on behalf of SEI.

OFAC also designated four China-based entities for being owned or controlled by or for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Emily Liu: Abascience Tech Co. Ltd., Raybeam Optronics Co. Ltd., Raytronic Corporation Limited, and Sunway Tech Co., Ltd. Liu has used these companies to support her proliferation activities.

Ajily Software Procurement Group

Today, OFAC designated the Ajily Software Procurement Group as a significant transnational criminal organization (TCO) pursuant to E.O. 13581, "Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations." The Ajily Software Procurement Group, based in Iran, uses hackers to steal engineering software programs from the United States and other western countries. Some of this software was sold to Iranian military and government entities, which are unable to acquire it overtly because of U.S. export controls and sanctions. The hackers use computer servers located in multiple western countries to carry out their thefts. The Ajily Software Procurement Group is the eighth TCO targeted under E.O. 13581.

OFAC designated Iranian national Mohammed Saeed Ajily for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Ajily Software Procurement Group. Mohammed Saeed Ajily is an Iranian businessman who directs Ajily Software Procurement Group hackers to steal specific software programs. Once the software is illegally acquired, Ajily uses multiple companies to market and sell the stolen computer programs in Iran. Some of this software, which is export controlled given its use in the design of rockets and GPS-guided weaponry, was sold to Iranian military and government entities. Ajily also procured specialized software for Malek Ashtar University of Technology, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on July 12, 2012 and is one of the major research institutes contained under the MODAFL umbrella.

OFAC designated Iranian national Mohammed Reza Rezakhah for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Ajily Software Procurement Group. Mohammed Reza Rezakhah is a computer hacker who steals software programs from western countries and cracks software protections, at the direction of Ajily, in order for the Ajily Software Procurement Group to sell the stolen technology, including to Iranian military and government entities.

OFAC also designated Iran-based Andisheh Vesal Middle East Company for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Ajily Software Procurement Group. Andisheh Vesal Middle East Company is a company used by Mohammed Saeed Ajily to market and sell Ajily Software Procurement Group stolen technology, including to Iranian purchasers.

Department of Justice Action

OFAC closely coordinated today's action with the Department of Justice, which yesterday released details regarding its law enforcement action against some of the persons in the Ajily Software Procurement Group.

State Department's Designations

Separately, the U.S. Department of State today designated two entities pursuant to E.O. 13382 for engaging, or attempting to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The State Department designated the IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (ASF SSJO), which is involved in Iranian ballistic missile research and flight test launches. In addition, the State Department designated the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (RSSJO), which is responsible for the research and development of ballistic missiles.

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs

Monday, July 17, 2017

Two Iranian Nationals Charged in Hacking of Vermont Software Company

An indictment was unsealed today charging Mohammed Reza Rezakhah, 39 and Mohammed Saeed Ajily, 35, both Iranian nationals, with a criminal conspiracy relating to computer fraud and abuse, unauthorized access to, and theft of information from, computers, wire fraud, exporting a defense article without a license, and violating sanctions against Iran. The court issued arrest warrants for both defendants.

Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security Dana J. Boente, Acting U.S. Attorney Eugenia A.P. Cowles of the District of Vermont, Assistant Director Scott Smith of the FBI's Cyber Division, and Special Agent in Charge Vadim Thomas of the FBI's Albany, New York Field Office made the announcement.

According to the allegations in the indictment filed in Rutland, Vermont, beginning in or around 2007, Rezakhah, Ajily, and a third actor who has already pleaded guilty in the District of Vermont for related conduct, conspired together to access computers without authorization in order to obtain software which they would then sell and redistribute in Iran and elsewhere outside the U.S. Ajily, a businessman, would task Rezakhah and others with stealing or unlawfully cracking particular pieces of valuable software. Rezakhah would then conduct unauthorized intrusions into victim networks to steal the desired software. Once the software was obtained, Ajily marketed and sold the software through various companies and associates to Iranian entities, including universities and military and government entities, specifically noting that such sales were in contravention of U.S. export controls and sanctions.

As part of this conspiracy, in October 2012, Rezakhah hacked a Vermont-based engineering consulting and software design company best known for its software that supports aerodynamics analysis and design for projectiles. This software is designated as a "defense article" on the U.S. Munitions List of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), meaning it cannot be exported from the U.S. without a license from the U.S. Department of State. Ajily thereafter promoted the same software as one of the products he could offer to his Iranian clients.

The charges in the indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The FBI's Albany Cyber Squad investigated the case. The case is being prosecuted by Acting U.S. Attorney Eugenia A.P. Cowles of the District of Vermont and Deputy Chief Sean Newell of the National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section. The Justice Department's Office of International Affairs also provided significant assistance in this matter.